COMMISSIONER v. FIRST SECURITY
BANK: ALLOCABILITY UNDER SECTION
482 OF LEGALLY NONRECEIVABLE
INCOME
In Commissioner v. First Security Bank,1 the Supreme Court
addressed for the first time the operation and scope of section
482 of the Internal Revenue Code, which authorizes the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to allocate income 2 among
taxpayers controlled by the same interests.3 In an opinion
written by Justice Powell,4 the Court resolved a conflict between
the Seventh and Tenth Circuits' by holding that the Commissioner may not allocate income under section 482 to a taxpayer
who has not actually received the income, if it would violate
federal law6 for him to recei;ve it.
U.S. 394 (1972).
Section 482 also authorizes the Commissioner to allocate deductions, credits, and
allowances. This Comment will deal only with the allocation of income.
3
Section 482 provides:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses...
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the
Secretary or his delegate may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross
income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such
organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution,
apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of
taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any such organizations, trades, or
business.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 482.
Section 482 conditions the Commissioner's power to allocate income on two
requirements: the taxpayers must be controlled by the same interests, and there must be
either an evasion of taxes or a failure clearly to reflect income. This Comment will not
discuss the factors necessary to establish the existence of control. For a discussion of the
control requirement, see Hewitt, Section 482-ReaocationofIncome andDeductionsBetween
Related Persons-Upto Date, N.Y.U. 22D INST. ON FED. TAX., 381, 383-85 (1964). Nor will
this Comment discuss what constitutes an evasion of taxes for purposes of § 482. It should
be remembered that an evasion of taxes is not an essential element for a § 482 allocation.
Section 482 may be invoked alternatively "to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to
reflect the income" of related taxpayers. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 482. These two
considerations independently trigger the operation of § 482. Central Cuba Sugar Co. v.
Commissioner, 198 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1952). A defense of legitimate business purpose,
sufficient against a claim of tax evasion, is inadequate to prevent an allocation necessary
"clearly to reflect the income" of related taxpayers. Dillard-Waltermire, Inc. v.
Campbell, 255 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1958); Eli Lilly & Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 990
(Ct. Cl. 1967); Oil Base, Inc., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1838 (1964), affd, 362 F.2d 212
(9th Cir. 1966). In invoking his § 482 powers, the Commissioner usually claims that the
allocation is necessary to reflect income clearly; it is that type of claim which was made in
First Security and which is treated in this Comment.
4
Mr. Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Blackmun, joined by Mr. Justice White,
in separate opinions.
dissented
5
Compare Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, 436 F.2d 1192 (10th Cir.
1971), affd, 405 U.S. 394 (1972), with Local Finance Corp. v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d
629 6(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 956 (1969).
The Court indicated that it would have reached the same result if receipt had been
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After discussing briefly the purpose of section 482, and the
arm's length standard established in the regulations for the
allocation of income under that provision, this Comment will
examine the way in which the courts have dealt with allocations
to taxpayers who have not received the income in question and
who are barred by law from receiving that income. Specifically,
it will criticize the approach taken by the Supreme Court in First
Security as mechanical and unresponsive to the Congressional
intent behind the provision in question. The Comment will point
to the inadequacy of the traditional arm's length standard in
cases in which the taxpayer has not received and legally may not
receive the income in question. And it will propose a general
standard which would be applicable to all sectioh 482 cases, but
which would incorporate the arm's length standard as the most
useful expression of the general standard in most cases.
I.

BACKGROUND: CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
AND THE ARM'S LENGTH STANDARD

Section 482 and its statutory predecessors represent legislative attempts to limit the ability of affiliated groups of taxpayers
to reduce tax liability by diverting income and deductions from
one member of the group to another.7 It stems ultimately from
section 240(d) of the Revenue Act of 1921, which was aimed at
remedying the shifting of income to a foreign subsidiary. Section
240(d) authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
consolidate the accounts of related trades and businesses "for the
purpose of making an accurate distribution or apportionment of
gains, profits, income, deductions, or capital ....
Section 482's immediate statutory predecessor was section
45 of the 1939 Code,9 which contained in pertinent part
language identical to that of the present section 482. Section 45
was first enacted in the 1928 Revenue Act.' 0 Its purpose, as
prohibited by state law, 405 U.S. at 406 n.22, as was the case in Local Finance Corp., 48
T.C. 7773, affeL 407 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 956 (1969).
The tax savings which can result from such diversions of income and deductions are
of several kinds: income diverted to a foreign subsidiary ordinarily is not subject to United States taxation; income shifted to a trade corporation within the Western Hemisphere
is taxed at a lower effective tax rate, see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § § 921-22; income
transferred to a loss corporation can be sheltered by its losses; income diverted to
individuals is taxed at a different rate; and income split among a number of corporate
taxpayers can reduce tax liability because of multiple surtax exemptions (although the
availability of multiple surtax exemptions is presently being phased out, INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § § 1562, 1564). B. BITIKER &J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
15.06, at 21-22 (3d ed. 1971).
8
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 240 (d), 42 Stat. 260.
9

Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 45,53 Stat. 25.
l°Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 45,45 Stat. 806.
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stated by the House Ways and Means Committee in 1928, was to
provide the Commissioner with power to allocate income and
deductions among related taxpayers "in order to prevent
evasion (by the shifting of profits, the making of fictitious sales,
and other methods frequently adopted for the purpose of
'milking'), and in order clearly to reflect their true tax
liability."11
The regulations promulgated under section 482 provide a
more specific statement of purpose: "[t]he purpose of section
482 is to place a controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an
uncontrolled taxpayer, by determining, according to the standard of an uncontrolled taxpayer, the true taxable income from
the property and business of a controlled taxpayer." 12 They
proceed to define the "true taxable income" of a controlled
taxpayer as "the taxable income.., which would have resulted
to the controlled taxpayer, had it in the conduct of its affairs...
dealt with the other member or members of the group at arm's
length." 13

The standard adopted in the regulations14 can be illustrated
in a case involving A, the parent corporation, B, a foreign
subsidiary, and C, an unrelated taxpayer.1 5 Let us assume that
the rate of the foreign tax, to which B is subject, is lower than the
rate of the United States tax, to which A is subject. A has
property with a cost basis of $10,000 and a fair market value of
$25,000. A sells the property to B for $10,000. The amount
realized by A is equal to its cost basis, and A therefore realizes no
income. Immediately after buying the property from A, B sells it
to C for $25,000, and B reports a gain of $15,000, the excess of
the amount B realized over Bs basis in the property. Using the
powers granted him in section 482, the Commissioner can
allocate $15,000 of Bs income to A, thereby increasing the total

I1

H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1928), 1939-2 CuM. BULL 395. See
alsoS. REP.No.960, 70th Cong., Ist Sess. 24 (1928), 1939-2 CuM. BULL.426; Ballentine
Motor Co., 39 T.C. 348,357 (1962), affd,321 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1963); Seminole Flavor
Co., 124 T.C. 1215, 1228 (1945).
Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(b) (1962). The first regulations interpreting § 482 were
promulgated in 1934 and were retained virtually unchanged until 1968. The 1968
amendments incorporated the prior regulations and provided additional guidelines and
formulas for the allocation of income and deductions in specific situations. See generally
Jenks, TreasuryRegulations UnderSection 482, 23 TAx LAW. 279 (1969).
The portions of the presentregulations discussed in this Comment were present in
the earlier regulations. The 1968 amendments offer no assistance in understanding the
issues and problems treated in this Comment and will, therefore, not be discussed.
13
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (a) (1962).
4
The arm's length standard is explained elsewhere in the regulations as "that of an
uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer."
Treas.
15 Reg. § 1.482-1 (b) (1) (1962).
E.g., Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cer. denied,
296 U.S. 645 (1935).
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tax liability of the controlled corporate group by reducing the
amount of income given preferential treatment and raising A's
tax liability to what it would have been had it sold the property
to an unrelated party. While there is some authority for
allocating income under section 482 on a test of whether a
related business entity has a legitimate business purpose, 6 it is
the arm's length standard applied in this example that is
generally used by the courts to determine whether an
7 allocation
is necessary to produce a clear reflection of income.'
II. PRECEDENTS UNDER SECTION 482
Before First Security, the Tax Court decided three cases
involving allocations of income under section 482 and its
predecessor provision to taxpayers who did not receive and
legally could not receive that income. The Tax Court struck
down the Commissioner's allocation in the first two cases, L.E.
Shunk Latex Products,Inc.18 and Nichols Loan Corp.,19 and it upheld
the allocation in the most recent case, LocalFinanceCorp.20
16

1n Hamburgers York Road, Inc., 41 T.C. 821 (1964), the court held that all the
income of a corporation could be allocated under § 482 to its affiliate corporation, for the
reasons that there was no substantial business purpose for separate incorporation, that the
business was a single, integrated enterprise, and that the taxable earnings of the related
businesses could all be attributed to the goodwill and business organization of the
taxpayer. The reasoning and result of the court is criticized in Mansfield, The 482
proposed Regs: The problems with which practitionerswill have to contend, 28 J. TAX. 66, 67
(1968). Courts have also disregarded a taxable entity on the theory that the principal
purpose in establishing a separate corporate taxpayer was avoidance of federal income
tax. SeeJ.R. Land Co. v. United States, 361 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1966).
The principle that a taxable entity may be disregarded for the reason that it is a mere
sham without legitimate business purpose is open to serious question when used in the
application of § 482. The operation of § 482 presupposes the existence of at least two
taxable entities in order to allocate income from the one to the other. There is a paradox
in recognizing the separate existence of a related taxpayer in order to invoke the statute
and then to disregard the existence of the related business in order to apply the provision.
SeeMiles-Conley Co., 10 T.C. 754 (1948), affd, 173 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1949); Ff Shaker
Apartments,
Inc. v. United States, 66-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9538 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
17 E.g., Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub. nova
Danica Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 395 U.S. 933 (1969); SimonJ. Murphy Co. v.
Commissioner, 231 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1956); Commissioner v. Chelsea Products, Inc.,
197 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952).
A court will uphold the Commissioner's allocation unless the taxpayer can show that
the allocation is arbitrary or unreasonable, Spicer Theater, Inc. v. Commissioner, 346
F.2d 704 (6th Cir. 1965); Ballentine Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 796 (4th Cir.
1963).
1818 T.C. 940 (1952).
1921 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 805 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, 321 F.2d 905 (7th Cir.
1963). The Tax Court's decision in Nichols actually made no mention of § 482. Seenote
24 infra & accompanying text.
: 48 T.C. 773 (1967), aff4 407 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 956 (1969).
Another likely candidate for discussion at this point would seem at first glance to be
Campbell County State Bank, Inc., 37 T.C. 430 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, 311 F.2d
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A. L.E. Shunk Latex Products,Inc.
In the Shunk case, two related manufacturers of rubber
prophylactics sold their products to a distributor controlled by
the same interests that controlled the manufacturers. In January
1942, the distributor raised its prices, while the manufacturers
left their prices unchanged. Subsequently the Office of Price
Administration ordered that prices charged by manufacturers of
"rubber drug sundries," which included prophylactics, were not
to exceed the prices charged on December 1, 1941. The rollback
did not apply to retailers. Consequently, the distributor was free
to maintain its prices at the 1942 level, and was able to reap large
profits by buying at a depressed wholesale price and selling at a
comparatively high retail price. Using the authority granted
under section 482's predecessor provision,2 the Commissioner
allocated part of the distributor's income to the manufacturers on
the theory that a portion of the increased profit caused by the
price increase was earned by the manufacturers. The Tax Court
held that the allocation was improper, because under the OPA
order the manufacturers could not raise wholesale prices
22 and
therefore could not receive the income allocated to them.
B. Nichols Loan Corp.
In Nichols, the Commissioner allocated credit insurance
commissions received by the officers and principal shareholders
of corporations engaged in the small loan business to those
corporations, in the face of a state law which prohibited a
corporation from acting as an insurance agent and from
receiving insurance commissions. Prior to the incorporation of
the lending institutions, the loan business had been conducted by
several partnerships, and the insurance commissions were paid
to the individual partners, who were designated as agents of the
insurance companies writing the policies. After incorporation
the individual partners, who were now the officers and principal
shareholders of the loan corporations, continued to act as agents
of the insurance company, to receive the commission income and
to report it on their individual returns. When a borrower desired
credit insurance, employees of the corporation filled out the
374 (8th Cir. 1963). That case refers to a state prohibition against banks engaging in the
insurance business for the purpose of the showings that a separate business entity created
by'bank stockholders to sell insurance was not a mere sham. The application of § 482 is
not dependent upon a finding of an absence of business purpose, however, and therefore
the case is not relevant. See, note 3 supra. Furthermore, the court in Campbell County State

Bank found that the banks did not earn the disputed income, which by itself precludes the
application
of § 482.
21
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 45,53 Stat. 25.
2218 T.C. at 959-61.
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necessary insurance forms, collected the premiums, and turned
over the premiums to the corporate officers, who deducted a
commission and forwarded the remainder of the premiums to
the insurance company.23
In an opinion which made no reference to section 482,24 the
Tax Court struck down the Commissioner's allocation of the
commission income to the corporation. It went on the theory that
none of the corporations acted as an insurance agent or received
any of the commission income in violation of the state law - that
the corporations merely furnished the individual officers with
the accommodations and services that were necessary for the
officers to carry on their own business. Consistent with this view
of the facts, the court held that each corporation should be
disallowed that portion of its business expense deduction
attributable to the insurance business conducted on loan
company premises by the corporate officers in their individual
capacities.
C. Local Finance Corp.
Local Finance also involved an allocation of income in the
form of credit insurance commissions to the lender who
generated the credit insurance premiums, but in Local Finance
the Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit upheld the Commissioner's allocation. Five finance companies, all wholly owned
sulbsidiaries of Local Finance, were engaged in the business of
making small loans and, in connection with that business, made
credit insurance available to their debtors.2 1 Initially, the
insurance policies were written by an unrelated insurance
company, and the insurance commission income (40% of net
premiums plus a contingency amount) was received by two
general insurance agencies controlled by the same interests that
controlled the finance companies. But then- Local Finance
23
Actually, all the insurance premiums and commissions were received by one of the
officers. But the commissions were split among three officers on their tax returns. The
reasonableness of that division of income was not at issue in Nichols and is irrelevant for
our purposes.
24
For this reason alone, a court dealing with an allocation under § 482 should not
feel constrained to reconcile its holding with Nichols. See Local Finance Corp., 48 T.C.
773, 796, 798 (Tannenwald,J., concurring).
2521 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 811.
26
Credit insurance offers advantages to both the lender and the borrower. The
borrower relieves his family or estate from the obligation to repay the debt in the event of
loss of his earning power. The lender receives additional security on the loan and an extra
source of income. Aside from the benefits of security and income, a lending institution is
often obliged to make credit insurance available to its borrowers in order to offer services
comparable to those offered by his competitors. Local Finance Corp., 48 T.C. at 776-77.
See Alinco Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 373 F.2d 336, 337-38 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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formed its own insurance company, Grand National, which
entered into a reinsurance agreement with the independent
insurance company, under which Grand National received
90Y2% of the premiums. The Commissioner allocated 50% of
Grand National's net premium income to the finance companies,
and alternatively to the general insurance agencies.
The finance companies in Local Financenever received any
of the insurance commissions and were apparently barred from
receiving any monetary compensation for their insurance
activities by the relevant state loan and insurance laws. But the
Tax Court held that the state laws' prohibition on the finance
companies' reception of the income did not preclude the taxation
of that income to the companies. "It is well established,"
observed the" court, "that Congress establishes its own criteria for
the application of tax statutes . ..,27 Applying those criteria, the

court felt that the Commissioner's allocation to the finance
companies was necessary in order clearly to reflect their income,
"[s] ince the finance companies performed all the work of selling
and servicing the insurance and earned the right to compensation therefor and had the power of disposition over such income.
..28 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the Tax Court
that the finance companies' generating and processing of the
credit insurance justified the Commissioner's
allocation, regard29
less of the prohibitions of state law.
Both the Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit in LocalFinance
attempted to distinguish the Shunk and Nichols cases, but neither
court was convincing. The courts in Local Financenoted that in
Shunk the taxpayer had no income over which it could exercise
the power of disposition because it "could not have raised its
price whether to a controlled or wholly independent distributor." ° But the same can be said of the finance companies in Local
Finance;,they could not have charged a price greater than zero
for their insurance referrals to a controlled or an uncontrolled
2748 T.C. at 793. The court went on to say that "a tax statute should be interpreted so
as to give a uniform application to a nationwide scheme of taxation." Id Uniformity
would, of course, be attained if the courts were guided by a federal law prohibiting
receipt of income. But in light of the Tax Court's subsequent reliance upon Local Finance
in upholding the Commissioner's allocation in First Security, in which the legality of
receipt turned upon federal law, uniformity as such does not emerge as a pivotal
consideration. Rather, the crucial consideration appears to have been that taxability
should be determined by the principles of federal tax law, not by any other law.
2 848 T.C. at 793.
29407 F.2d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 1969). The Seventh Circuit indicated that it was not
uniformity as such but rather federal tax considerations that prevented state prohibitions
on receipt of income from determining federal tax liability. "Federal taxing statutes
apply their own criteria of what constitutes income." Id at 633. See note 27 supra
20407 F.2d at 634. The Tax Court expressed the same sentiments, 48 T.C. at 795, as
did Justice Blackmun in distinguishing Shunk in his dissenting opinion in First Security,
405 U.S. 394, 426 (1972).
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business entity. Inability to raise prices is not a distinguishing
feature of Shunk And the alleged distinction becomes no more
satisfying when the Seventh Circuit offers it in the following
form: "[the OPA regulations in Shunkprevented the generation
of the income which the Commissioner sought to allocate; here
Indiana law merely prohibited the receipt of the Commission
income by the finance companies." 31 What this statement
overlooks is that the taxpayer in Shunk did generate the
distributor's income which the Commissioner sought to allocate,
without the necessity of raising its own prices, in the same way
that the finance companies in Local Finance generated the
commission3 2income without raising their prices for the referrals
above zero.

The Tax Court in Local Finance attempted to distinguish
Nichols by emphasizing that in Nichols the loan business and the
insurance agency existed as separate enterprises prior to
incorporation, and that only the loan business was transferred to
the corporation:
They [the officers and principal shareholders], in the
conduct of their insurance agency business, sold the
insurance on the lives of the debtors of the corporations, and received in their own right the commissions.
This was the decisive factor in that case. The
corporations had no right to the commissions
or any
33
power over the disposition thereof.
But it defies economic reality to explain the result in Nichols by
saying that only the loan business was transferred to the
corporations and that the individuals retained the insurance
agency business, for it was the loan business that produced the
credit insurance customers for the insurance agency and thereby
generated the insurance agency's income. The court's reference
to the absence of a right on the part of the corporations to the
commissions provides no explanation. That reference was not to
prohibitions of state law, for similar prohibitions were ignored in
the Local Finance case itself; rather it was to the legal
arrangements made by the parties at the time of incorporation.
But these arrangements are entitled to no more consideration for
tax purposes than the anticipatory assignments of income
31407 F.2d at 634-35.
32
Judge Tannenwald, in his concurring opinion in the Tax Court, 48 T.C. at 796,
798-99, and the Seventh Circuit, in a footnote, 407 F.2d at 634 n.8, also distinguished
LocalFinancefrom Shunk on the basis that only in Local Financedid the taxpayer perform
the services for which the allocated payments were made. But it is not at all clear that
payments made to the distributor in Shunk were made only for the services performed by
the distributor. See text accompanying note 75 infa
3348 T.C. at 794.
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5 The Local
disregarded in Lucas v. Earl34 and Helvering v. Horst."
Finance courts, having surmounted the obstacle posed by the
illegality of receipt in the Local Finance case, should, then, have
concluded that Nicholswas wrongly decided.36
As Shunk, Nichols and Local Finance are essentially indistinguishable, the cases simply represent two different approaches
to the question whether income can be allocated under section
482 to taxpayers who have not and could not legally receive the
income. It was that question which was before the courts in First
Security.

III.

COMMISSIONER V. FIRST SECURITY BANK
A.

The Facts

In FirstSecurity the Commissioner allocated income consisting of credit insurance premiums to two banks who did not
actually receive the income, and who were considered barred by
federal banking law from receiving insurance premiums.3 7 The
financial arrangements in First Security involved First Security
Corporation (Holding Company), five wholly owned subsidiaries, and an unrelated insurance company (National). Holding
Company's subsidiaries included: two national banks, First
Security Bank of Utah and First Security Bank of Idaho
(Banks); a management company, First Security Company
(Management Company); an insurance agency, Ed. D. Smith
and Sons (Smith); and an insurance company, First Security Life
Insurance Company of Texas (Security Life. Beginning in 1948
the Banks offered to arrange credit insurance for their borrowers, which was written by two independent credit insurance
carriers. Whenever a customer of the Banks took out a loan, a
3'281 U.S. 111 (1930) (assignment of income from personal services ineffective for
tax purposes under predecessor to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61).
35311 U.S. 112 (1940) (assignment of income from property ineffective for tax
purposes
under predecessor to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6 1).
36

See48 T.C. at 796,798 (Tannenwald,J., concurring).
The Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 461, 39 Stat. 753, provided that a national bank may
act as an insurance agent in any place where "the population ... does not exceed five
thousand inhabitants .... "This provision, added to § 5202 of the Revised Statutes in
1916, was omitted from the 1918 amendment and reenactment of § 5202 of the Revised
Statutes by § 20 of the War Finance Corporation Act, ch. 45, 40 Stat. 506, 512. Recent
editions of the United States Code have continued this omission.
The implicit prohibition against a bank in a community over 5,000 acting as an
insurance agent is incorporated in the current regulations of the Comptroller of the
Currency, 12 C.F.R. § § 2.1-2.5 (1971), and the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have indicated
that the prohibition remains in force. Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents,
Inc. 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968); Commissioner v. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794 (4th
Cir. 1966).
37
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banking employee informed the borrower of the availability of
credit insurance. If the borrower desired the insurance, the
employee provided the necessary forms and collected the
premiums. The premiums and completed forms were forwarded
to Management Company, which kept records of the insurance
purchased, forwarded the premiums to the independent insurance carriers, and processed claims filed under the policies. The
cost to Banks and Management Company of providing these
credit insurance services was negligible.'
During the years from 1948 to 1954, the independent
insurance carriers paid commissions to Smith, which was
designated the carriers' agent, in an amount ranging from forty
to fifty-five percent of the net insurance premiums collected.
These payments were included in the income of Management
Company.
In 1954, at the suggestion of American National, another
unrelated insurance company, Holding Company organized its
own insurance company, Security Life. Security Life reinsured
the credit life insurance policies taken out with National by
debtors of the Banks. Security Life received eighty-five percent
of the insurance premiums for assuming the risk under the
policies, and National retained fifteen percent of the premiums
as compensation for actuarial and accounting services. 39 No
commissions were paid under the new arrangements.
Security Life reported the entire eighty-five percent of the
insurance premiums in its income for the years 1955-1959.40 The
Commissioner used his powers under section 482 to allocate
forty percent of Security Life's premium income to the Banks
and alternatively to Management Company. This allocation
increased the total tax liability of the controlled group, because
Security Life was taxed at an effectively
lower rate than either
41
the Banks or Management Company.
3
The yearly cost to each organization for providing insurance-related services was
approximately
$2,000. 405 U.S. at 397.
39
National proposed a reinsurance arrangement to Holding Company and other
financial institutions because the high potential profits from writing credit insurance
offered lending institutions an incentive to form their own insurance companies. The
reinsurance arrangement whereby National would receive a percentage fee for services
was intended to salvage a portion of American National's investment in the credit
insurance
business. See 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1320, 1323 (1967).
40
0n advice of counsel, the Banks never directly received commission income,
acting on the assumption that a receipt would violate federal banking law. Id at 1325.
41
Security Life received preferential tax treatment as a life insurance company for
the applicable years. The Life Insurance Company Tax Act for 1955, ch. 83, 70 Stat. 36,
applicable to the years 1955-57, and, to a lesser degree the Life Insurance Company
Income Tax Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-69, 73 Stat. 112, applicable to later years,
subjected insurance companies to a lower effective tax rate than ordinary corporations.
See generally8J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 44A.08 (1970 rev. ed.).

194
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The Tax Court and Tenth Circuit Decisions

The Tax Court in FirstSecurity upheld the Commissioner's
allocation on the authority of its decision in Local Finance.42 But
the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the mere generation
43
and channeling of income are insufficient bases for taxation.
The Tenth Circuit interpreted section 482 as a codification for
controlled taxpayers of the assignment-of-income doctrine,
developed by the courts under section 61 as a general weapon
against anticipatory arrangements to spread income. 44 Under
that doctrine, section 61 has been held to allow the taxation of a
nonrecipient on incbme which he earned and was entitled 4to5
receive, but which he voluntarily assigned to another person.
But in viewing the FirstSecurity case as controlled by section 61
assignment-of-income notions, the Tenth Circuit relied heavily
on a case in which a sharply divided Tax Court refused to apply
the assignment-of-income doctrine, PaulA. Teschner.4 6
In Teschner, the taxpayer won an annuity contract in a
contest. But, as he had been required to do by the rules of the
contest, the taxpayer had, at the time of entry, designated a
person under the age of eighteen (his daughter) to receive the
prize. The Tax Court held that the taxpayer was not taxable on
the contest income, because he had never had a right to receive
the prize - because he had not voluntarily given up the right to
receive the income which he had earned. The court stated: "the
taxpayer, while he had no power to dispose of income, had a
power to appoint or designate its recipient. Does the existence or
4226 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1320, 1326 (1967). For an elaboration of the holding in
Local Finance, see text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
43436 F.2d 1192 (10th Cir. 1971).
4While the Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's allocations in Local Financeand
First Security, and did so under § 482, the Tax Court's opinion in Local Financecontained
language which would support the contention that the Commissioner's powers are
functionally similar under § 61 and § 482. The court cited its own opinion in Grenada
Industries, Inc., 17 T.C. 231 (1951), affd,202 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 346 U.S.
819 (1953), for the proposition that § 482 "explicitly authorized the commissioner to
unscramble any such situation, so that income may be charged to the organization that
earned it," even though § 61 would be sufficient to accomplish the same result. 48 T.C. at
789. In fact, the Tax Court in Grenadasaid that § 61 adds nothing to the Commissioner's
powers under § 482, not that the operation of § 482 is limited by the assignment-ofincome concepts developed under § 61. Other courts, while not expressly limiting § 482
by § 61, have linked the two provisions together, in a manner which would suggest that §
61 is the foundation of § 482. The Second Circuit stated: "[Section 482] rests on the wellsettled policy that income is taxable under [section 61] of the 1954 Code to the party who
earns it...." Philipp Bros. Chemicals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 435 F.2d 53, 57 (2d Cir.

1970).

4See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (assignment of income from
property); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (assignment of income from personal

servicesI.
4638 T.C. 1003 (1962), nonacq., 1964-1 Cum.BULi- 6.
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exercise of such a power alone
' 47give rise to taxable income in his
hands? We think clearly not.
The Tenth Circuit in First Security quoted Teschner in
rejecting the suggestion that the mere generation and channeling
of income, without a right to receive that income, provided a
sufficient basis for taxation:
If this were the law, agents, conduits, fiduciaries, and
others in a similar capacity would be personally taxable
on the proceeds of their efforts. The charity fund-raiser
would be taxable on sums contributed as the result of
his efforts. The employee would be taxable on income
generated for his employer by his efforts. Such results,
completely at variance with every accepted concept of
Federal income taxation, demonstrate the fallacy of the
premise. 48
The Tenth Circuit stood on weak ground in resting its
decision on Teschner. The product of a narrow majority in the
Tax Court, 49 the Teschner decision was not acquiesced in by the
Commissioner. 50 It stands as an exception in a line of cases in
which transferors of income have been held to have received the
beneficial enjoyment of that income, and it has not become a
cornerstone of the law under section 61.
The precedential value of Teschneris even weaker in section
482 cases, for the Commissioner's powers of allocation under
section 482 should not be limited by the assignment-of-income
notions developed by the courts under section 61. Such a
limitation would not render section 482 superfluous,5 ' but it
47Id at 1009.

48436 F.2d at 1197, quotingPaulA. Teschner, 38 T.C. at 1007.
49
Seven dissenting judges would have taxed the taxpayer on the basis that his efforts
alone generated the income, and that he had the power to control the disposition of the
income by designating the recipient of the prize. 38 T.C. at 1010-11 (Atkins, J.,
dissenting).
.501964-1 CuM. BULL 6.
51
The Third Circuit has suggested: "In every case in which [§ 4821 is applied its
application will iecessarily result in an apparent conflict with the literal requirements of
some other provision of the act. If this were not so [§ 4821 would be wholly superfluous."
National Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 600, 602, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794
(1943). While it may be true that an allocation of income under § 482 often will not
comport with the literal provisions of other sections of the Code, few provisions are so
closely related as § 61 and § 482.
Hinging the allocability of income undei § 432 on the same right to receive that is
required for taxation under § 61 does not render § 482 superfluous under the following
reading of the sections: before income may be allocated under § 482 it must first be
defined, and for that one must turn to § 61. Section 482 provides the Commissioner with
a standard for allocating less than the entire amount of income arising from a particular
transaction, an option not available to him under the more general provisions of § 61. In
§ 482 the Commissioner has a more precise instrument for dissecting the financial
arrangements of related taxpayers than he does in § 61 for taxing income generated by
unrelated taxpayers. Rubin v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d 650, 653 (2d Cir. 1970).
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would do violence to section 482's purpose of placing the related
taxpayer on a tax parity with the unrelated taxpayer. 52 The

related taxpayer, unlike the unrelated taxpayer, has access to the
pocket of the income-receiving entity; any income which a
related income-generating entity has no right to receive directly
is accessible to it indirectly. While, therefore, the absence of a
right to receive the income in question may be of some
significance when the income generator is an unrelated taxpayer, it is of minimal significance when the income generator is
a related taxpayer. In the case of related taxpayers, allocation of
income to the generator of that income produces the clearest
reflection of income. Even assuming, then, that Teschnerremains
strong authority in section 61 cases, the crucial elements of
control and indirect access to income which are present in
section 482 make the reasoning of Teschner and the fears

expressed in Teschnerwith respect to the inevitable consequences
of taxing
the income generator 53 inapposite to section 482
54
cases.

C.

The Supreme Court Decision

The Supreme Court in First Security affirmed the Tenth
Circuit's holding that the Commissioner's allocation of premium
income to the Banks was improper. The Court agreed with the
Tenth Circuit that the "origination of business does not
necessarily result in [taxable] income,, 5 5 but rested its holding
on a different ground. Like the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme

Court held that legal entitlement to receipt is a necessary
"52Note 12 supra& accompanying text. In comparing the scope of § 61 and § 482, one
should bear in mind the advice of the Second Circuit in Rohmer v. Commissioner: "the
concepts employed in construing one section of a statute are not necessarily pertinent
when construing another with a distinguishable background." 153 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir.
1946).
53
See text accompanying notes 48 supra& 76-78 infra.
54
Even if a court takes the unlikely position that Teschneris correct and § 61 defines
the outer limits of the Commissioner's power under § 482, there remains a basis for
arguing that Teschner does not forestall an allocation of income in the credit insurance
cases. Teschner held that the taxpayer could not be taxed on the amount of the contest
prize, because he was required to designate a recipient other than himself when he
entered the contest. The taxpayer could have sold the right to be designated as the
recipient on his entry to a third party. This designation had a small market value before
the taxpayer won the contest. But, within the limits of the Teschner holding, the taxpayer
could have been taxed on the amount of that value, for the reason that that amount was
available for the taxpayer to possess.
On a similar theory, the lending institution in a credit insurance case could pass on
the nonreceivable insurance commissions to its borrowers in the form of lower insurance
rates. The institution would thereby generate more loan business and more interest
income. If the potential increment in income could be measured, it might be allocable to
the lending institution. See note 64 infra
-5405 U.S. 394, 401 n.ll.
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condition of taxation.56 But rather than resting this conclusion on
the judicially developed assignment-of-income doctrine under
section 61, as the Tenth Circuit did, the Supreme Court found
the legal entitlement requirement within section 482 itself. The
Court cited the following sentence contained in the regulations
promulgated under section 482: "[tlhe interests controlling a
group of controlled taxpayers are assumed to have complete
power to cause each controlled taxpayer so to conduct its affairs
that its transactions and accounting records truly reflect the
taxable income from the property and business of each of the
controlled taxpayers." 7 From this sentence the Court concluded
that the operation of section 482 is conditioned upon the
''complete power" of the controlling interests to cause the
taxpayer to receive the income in question.58 The Court
observed that "Holding Company had no such power unless it
acted in violation of federal banking law," and indicated that the
statute and regulations did not presume that the controlling
interests would possess the power to force a subsidiary to violate
law. 59 The crucial elements of "complete power"
and control
°
were, therefore, missing in the Court's view.'
It should be noted at the outset that the Court's holding
rested upon a dubious interpretation of federal banking law: that
while the Banks would have violated the law by receiving
commission income, they did not violate the law by offering
credit insurance to their borrowers and by collecting and
forwarding premiums, eighty-five percent of which eventually
went to a related insurance company. 61 If the prohibition of the
banking law were read to extend to the performance of
insurance services as well as the reception of insurance
commissions the conduct of the Banks would clearly be illegal,
56

Because the Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's allocation to the Banks, it
rejected his alternative allocation to Management Company. That alternative allocation

was not, therefore, before the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court. If it had been, it
might well have been upheld, because Management Company did not operate under the
same legal prohibition against receiving insurance commission income as did the Banks.
The allocation to Management Company could be justified under the arm's length
standard by the following analysis. The Banks and Management Company would be

viewed together as the controlled taxpayer. The arm's length test asks what income
would be realized by the controlled taxpayer in a transaction with an unrelated entity, in

this case an unrelated insurance company. The answer is that the unrelated insurance
company
would pay the commission income to Management Company.
57Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (b)(1) (1973).

58405 U.S. at 404-05.
591d at 405.
60Id

611d at 402-03 n.16, 405. The Court noted that the Commissioner, the Tax Court,
the Tenth Circuit, and the Solicitor General all assumed that the Banks' conduct was
lawful. Id at 403 n.16. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall concluded that the
Banks' solicitation of insurance premiums violated the federal statute. Id at 412-13.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

198

[Vol. 122:184

and the Court's holding would be insupportable. For it could no
longer be argued that the Commissioner's allocation improperly
assumed that Holding Company had the power to force a
subsidiary to violate the law, for Holding Company would
already have done just that. Holding Company would have
demonstrated its "complete power" to control the income
generated and received by its subsidiaries, regardless of the
command of the law, and the Commissioner's power to allocate
income under section 482 could no longer be questioned. The
doctrine that income earned through illegal activities is taxable, 62 coupled with the assignment-of-income notions developed
under section 61 and codified for related taxpayers
in section
63
482, would result in taxable income to the Banks.
Assuming that the Court's interpretation of federal banking
law is acceptable, its decision remains open to question on two
grounds. First, it is by no means clear that the Court was correct
in suggesting that the controlling interests could exercise the
power contemplated by that part of the regulations quoted by the
Court only through a violation of the law. There seem to be
several legal means by which the controlling interests could have
exercised "power to cause each controlled taxpayer so to
conduct its affair that its transactions and accounting records
truly reflect" income. They could simply have forgone any
benefit from insurance sales either by causing the Banks not to
offer credit insurance, or by causing the Banks to allow those
profits to fall into the hands of an unrelated insurance company.
Or they could have sought to retain some benefit by causing the
banks to pass on the profits from the insurance to borrowers in
the form of reduced premium rates. 64 Of course, any of these
alternatives would have produced tax consequences different
62

SeeJames v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (embezzled money is taxable
income
63 to the embezzler).
1n Estate of Geiger v. Commissioner, 352 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1965), cert denied, 382
U.S. 1012 (1966), the Eighth Circuit held that a bank employee embezzling bank funds
through the device of crediting the checking accounts of her friends when no deposits had
been made was taxable on the illegally credited amounts, even though these funds did not
pass directly through the taxpayer's hands. It was sufficient for taxation that the
taxpayer's conduct made the funds available to others. See also Barbara M. Bailey, 52 T.C.
115, 64affdper curian, 420 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1969).
That the Banks might have followed this course suggests that a different allocation
by the Commissioner might have been upheld by the First Security Court. If the Banks
did reduce their premiums, the reduction presumably would have attracted new
borrowers and increased the interest income from the loan business. The Commissioner
might have sought to allocate to the Banks the increment in interest income which would
have resulted had the Banks passed on the insurance profits in this way.
The most obvious problem with this approach is the difficulty of determining the
amount of additional income that could be generated by a reduction in insurance
premium rates. This difficulty is complicated by the possibility that competitors in the
credit insurance and loan businesses would respond by reducing their rates. Furthermore,
if the taxpayer did not have extra capital available for loans beyond current borrower
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from those sought by the Commissioner. And as the allocation
actually chosen by the Commissioner was based on a course of
conduct that was.illegal, it might be argued that the controlling
interests, in their inability through any of these devices to truly
reflect that income which the Commissioner sought to attribute
to the Banks, did not possess the "complete power" referred to in
the regulations.
Second, if the quoted sentence of the regulatiosn is
interpreted to deal only with the power to compel the controlled
taxpayers to report income in a manner consistent with a true
reflection of income, regardless of whether the taxpayer actually
demand, it could receive no benefit from the increase in business that could otherwise be
derived from a reduction in insurance rates.
These measurement problems could be avoided by a scheme under which the lender
would increase his interest rates for borrowers taking credit insurance by an amount
equal to the reduction in insurance rates, so that the total cost of an insured loan remains
the same. On the basis of this alternative arrangement, the Commissioner could have
allocated all the commission income to the Banks on the reasonable assumption that
customer demand for the taxpayer's insured loans would remain unchanged. The
problem is that this banking arrangement would merely change the label of the income
from commission income to interest income and would probably violate federal banking
law. The arrangement by which premium rates are lowered and interest rates remain
unchanged may also violate federal banking law, but the fact that the amount of the
increased interest income would differ from the amount of the potential commission
income may make any violation less obvious.
Even if it is legal under the federal banking law, the allocation of income that the
taxpayer could have received from borrowers by lowering premium rates is of
questionable validity under the arm's length standard. The income which the
Commissioner sought to allocate to the Banks was the same income that was generated
by the transactions that did take place. But if the Commissioner were to allocate interest
income that the Banks would have received by passing on the insurance profits to
borrowers in the form of reduced premium rates, he would be hypothesizing income
from a transaction that did not take place. Several decisions under § 482 call into
question the propriety of such an allocation. The Tax Court has held that income may
not be allocated under § 482 on the theory that a taxpayer passed up an opportunity to
earn certain income and permitted it to be earned by a related taxpayer. Miles-Conley
Co., 10 T.C. 754, 762 (1948), affd, 173 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1949); Seminole Flavor Co.,
4 T.C. 1215, 1230 (1945). The theory of the allocation suggested above is that the Banks
generated the disputed income but passed up the opportunity to earn the income in a
manner that would have permitted legal receipt.
The Tax Court has also held that § 482 may not be used to create income when none
has been realized in the actual transaction between the related taxpayers. See Kerry Inv.
Co., CCH TAX CT. REP. $ 31425, at 2772 (1972); Kahler Corp., [1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH TAX CT. REP. 31426, at 2783 (1972); Smith-Bridgman & Co., 16 T.C.
287, 293 (1951). Contra, B. Forman Co. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1144, 1155-56 (2d
Cir. 1972). Thus, if a parent makes an interest-free loan to a subsidiary and the subsidiary
invests the proceeds of the loan in nonincome-producing property, the Tax Court will
not allocate imputed interest income to the parent. See Kahler Corp., supra. But see B.
Forman Co., supra. Under the approach suggested above for the FirstSecurity case, the
Commissioner would impute legally receivable income to the generating taxpayer when
no legally receivable income resulted from the actual transactions. But income not legally
receivable by the taxpayer was realized by the related insurance company. The suggested
approach does not, then, create income from a transaction in which no income was
realized; rather, it seeks to change the character of realized income in order to justify an
allocation to the generating taxpayer.
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received the income attributed to him, the controlling interests
could have maintained the same financial arrangements but
cause the Banks to report the commission income. If it is the
actual receipt of commission income rather than the underlying
conduct that is the mark of illegality,6 5 then the reporting of
income generated but not received by the taxpayer would not
violate the law. The reporting of income not actually received
would impose no strain on the Banks in light of their access to
the funds of their related companies.
Even if the Court was correct in suggesting that the
controlling interests could not exercise the power contemplated
by the regulations without violating the law, its decision is
subject to a second, and far more important, criticism: the
decision gives more recognition to the legality of receipt than to
the economic realities of transactions among related taxpayers.
The majority of the Court saw no distinction between a related
and an unrelated taxpayer with regard to the Commissioner's
powers of allocation. 6 But, as this Comment has previously
argued,67 the distinction is a crucial one. Regardless of what
standards are appropriate for the application of the assignmentof-income doctrine under section 61, the application of section
482 should depend not on the legality of receipt by the taxpayer,
but on the ability of the controlling interests to divert any funds
of the related group to the taxpayer. While the controlling
interests will generally not divert particular income to an entity
who may not legally receive that income, they can at any time
divert whatever funds they wish to that entity. The right (legal or
other) of the entity to receive the particular income assumes
minimal significance in light of the indirect access of related
parties to the funds of the group. Justice Marshall advanced this
position in his dissenting opinion in First Security.
It makes absolutely no sense to examine this case with a
technical eye as to whether respondents actually
5
Seetext accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
66The Court stated:
The fact of affiliation, enabling referral of the business to another subsidiary
in the holding company group, does not alter the character of what was
done. The act which is relevant, in terms of generating insurance premiums
and commissions, is the referralof the business. Whether this referral is to an
affiliated or an unaffiliated insurance company should make no difference
as to whether the bank, which never receives the income, has earned it.
405 U.S. at 401, n. 11.Without indicating any distinction between § 61 and § 482, the
Court concluded:
We know of no decision of this Court wherein a person has been found to
have taxable income that he did not receive and that he was prohibited from
receiving. In cases dealing with the concept of income, it has been assumed
that the person to whom the income was attributed could have received it.
Id at67403.
Text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
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received or had a "right" to receive any commissions.
This is not a case involving independent companies or
private individuals where we must scrupulously avoid
taxing someone on money he will never receive
regardless of his will in the matter. This is a case
involving related corporations, and § 482 recognizes
that such corporations may be treated differently from
natural persons or unrelated corporations for certain
tax purposes.
* this entire complicated economic structureestablished, designed, administered, and amendable 68
by
the holding company-had the right to the proceeds.
IV. BEYOND THE ARM'S-LENGTH STANDARD: A
PROPOSAL FOR A GENERATION-OF-INCOME TEST

In section 482 Congress created a weapon to destroy the tax
advantages which inured to related taxpayers by reason of their
ability to shift assets freely among one another. The Supreme
Court in First Security limited the range of that weapon by
elevating the legal right of one related taxpayer to receive the
income in question over the economic fact that that related
taxpayer retained the ability to receive the income through
indirect means. The justification for the Commissioner's powers
of allocation under section 482 is that the taxpayer who diverts
income to a related taxpayer retains the benefit of that income
because of his indirect access to the assets of his related taxpayer.
That a taxpayer can not legally receive income which he diverts
to a related taxpayer in no way impairs that indirect access.
In First Security the controlling interests, through the
creation of an additional controlled insurance company, reduced
the tax liability incurred by members of the controlled group on
income derived from credit insurance referrals. The reduction
was a result of the tax preference given to the income of
insurance companies during the years in question. Congress
certainly did not intend that this preference protect income
generated by an ordinary corporation and diverted to a related
insurance company. 69 It was section 482's underlying purpose to
deny taxpayers the use of separate but controlled business
enterprises as a device for reducing tax liability, 70 and a Court
more responsive to that purpose would have upheld the
Commissioner's allocation of the commission income to the
Banks.
6'405 U.S. at 410 (citations omitted).
69
Seenote 41 supra.
70

Seetext accompanying notes 8-12 supra
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At the same time, however, the Court would have had to
acknowledge that a strict application of the arm's-length
standard does not fully support the Commissioner's allocation. It
is clear that the Banks and Security Life, the related insurance
company, did not deal with each other at arm's length. But the
illegality factor makes the application of the arm's-length
standard problematical. The Commissioner concluded that the
allocation to the Banks was necessary to clearly reflect income
because "in any arm's length arrangement [the Banks] would
have been compensated for their services."' 7' The Court, on the
other hand, concluded that the allocation was inconsistent with
section 482's purpose of placing the controlled taxpayer on a tax
parity with the uncontrolled taxpayer, and could not be upheld
under the arm's-length standard, because an uncontrolled bank
dealing at arm's length could not legally receive premium
income. 72 Neither the Commissioner's nor the Court's conclusion is completely satisfactory, for each depends on an
assumption with respect to an uncontrolled taxpayer's disposition to violate the law.
In order to apply the arm's-length transaction standard, it is
necessary to know what disposition an unrelated taxpayer would
make of the potential income in a similar transaction. But that
information is not available. An unrelated taxpayer offering
credit insurance in connection with a loan business has the
following alternatives with respect to the disposition of the
generated commission income: receive the income in violation
of federal banking law; divert the income to an unrelated
taxpayer; or forego the commission income and pass it on to
borrowers in the form of reduced insurance rates, in the hope of
increasing interest income. It is unlikely that many national
banks would directly receive commission income in violation of
the law or divert the income to unrelated taxpayers. Most banks
with no related business entity to whom they could divert the
income would probably pass the commission income on to their
borrowers in the form of reduced insurance rates 73 or not,
provide the service at all. Neither of these remaining alternatives
provides a satisfactory.74 basis for making allocations under the
arm's-length standard.
71

Brief for Petitioner at 10, Commissioner v. First Security Bank, 405 U.S. 394

(1972).

72405 U.S. at 407.
1t is, of course, possible that this course of conduct would violate federal banking

73

law. 7 4

For an explanation of the problems posed by applying the arm's length standard on
the basis of the assumption that an unrelated taxpayer would pass on the commission
income to borrowers, see note 64 supra
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This Comment has taken the position that, because of the
Banks' indirect access to the income diverted to the related
insurance company, the Commissioner's allocation produces the
clearest reflection of income and therefore advances section
482's underlying purpose. The fact that the allocation is not fully
supported by the arm's-length standard should not be considered
fatal. While the arm's-length standard is a convenient and usually
reliable method for apportioning income among taxpayers, it
should not be viewed as the sole standard for judging the
applicability of section 482, or as the sole method for
apportioning income after section 482 is found to be applicable.
The Supreme Court should have taken the opportunity in First
Security to adopt a general standard under section 482 which
would permit the Commissioner to allocate income to a
controlled taxpayer whenever the controlled taxpayer generates
income which the controlling interests divert to a related
taxpayer.
The propriety of the Commissioner's allocation under the
broader generation-of-income test is demonstrated by the
following analysis. Under the initial arrangements Management
Company received commission income ranging from forty to
fifty percent of the net insurance premiums (the customary
commission in the insurance business). Under the new arrangements, no commissions were paid, and Security Life retained
eighty-five percent of the premiums. That eighty-five percent of
the premiums was far more than Security Life had to receive in
order to be adequately compensated for assuming the risk under
the policies and far more than an independent insurance
company would have realized on the policies (as was demonstrated by the experience of the independent insurance carriers
who retained fifty to sixty percent of the premiums under the
original arrangements). Section 482 is applicable because the
Banks generated income that was diverted to a related taxpayer,
and the Commissioner's allocation of forty percent of the
premium income was reasonable because it left all parties to the
transaction adequately compensated for the services performed
and the risks undertaken.
. Under the proposed generation-of-income test, the Shunk
case would be decided in favor of the government. Shunk does
differ from the credit insurance cases in two respects, but neither
is significant. First, the manufacturers in Shunk did nothing more
than was absolutely necessary for them to receive the legal
wholesale price, while the lending institutions in the credit
insurance cases performed extra services (providing and filling
out insurance forms, collecting premiums and performing other
administrative and accounting services) which were not essential
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to their earning the legal interest income. But this difference is
insignificant-certainly not significant enough to justify a
difference in result-since the actual cost to the lending
institutions was characterized by the First Security courts as
negligible.75 Second, the income in Shunk was received directly
by the related business entity from the consumer, while in the
credit insurance cases the premiums were received by the
lending institutions and then diverted to the related entity. For
this reason, the conduct of the controlling interests in Shunk does
not arouse the same feeling of indignation as does the conduct of
the controlling interests in the credit insurance cases. But the
taxpayer in Shunk did generate the contested income and did
have access to the pocket of the related income-receiving entity.
These facts should be sufficient to justify the Commissioner's
allocation.
It is unnecessary to reconcile the proposed generation-ofincome test with the holding and the language in 7eschner.Even
if that case was correctly decided, it was decided under section 61
and not under section 482, to which the proposed test is
limited.76 If Teschner were decided under section 482 and the
proposed test, it would come out in favor of the government.
The proposed generation-of-income test would not produce
the results feared by the Teschner court-namely, that the
employee and the fundraiser would be taxed on the amounts
received by the employer and the charity because of their
efforts.7 7 The primary reason why these fears are unfounded is
the absence of the control factor necessary to call section 482 into
operation. But even if section 482 were applicable to the fundraiser and the employee, the proposed test would not justify an
allocation, for reasons which are instructive of the limits of the
generation-of-income test. The employee is compensated for his
efforts by his wages, and the profits received by his employer
represent compensation for capital risk. Without a showing that
the employee is receiving less than others in a similar position or
less than he deserves, there would be no evidence of a diversion
of income generated by him, and no allocation could be made.
The fundraiser is not taxed on the contributions he solicits,
because his efforts alone do not generate the contributions. The
charity, through its reputation for good works, is largely
responsible for the contributions. It might be argued that the
7-405 U.S. at 397.
76
As Judge Tannenwald indicated in his concurring opinion in Local Finance,when
an allocation can be sustained under § 482, there is "good reason for not entering the
mare's
nest of the decided cases under [§ 61]."48 T.C. at 799.
77
Note 48 supra & accompanying text.
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Commissioner could allocate to the volunteer fundraiser the
income which the charity would have to pay individuals to solicit
contributions in the absence of volunteers. However, were the
Commissioner to make such an allocation, he would have to
allow the fundraiser a charitable deduction equal to the allocated
78
amount, and thereby remove the net effect of the allocation.
V. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's rejection of the Commissioner's
allocation of income to the Banks in First Security will not have
any great effect on tax revenues. Except for some questionable
assumptions concerning federal banking law,79 the tax dispute in
that case would have presented no difficult issues. The cases
discussed are noteworthy primarily for the reason that they offer
an opportunity to examine the interplay between judicial
decisions and the development of federal income tax law.
Starting from a very general provision of the Code (section
482) with a limited legislative history, the Tax Court, the Tenth
Circuit and the Supreme Court each adopted a different
approach for resolving a somewhat difficult, but nontechnical,
tax question. This Comment has suggested that none of these
approaches was entirely satisfactory. The Tax Court decided in
favor of the government-probably the result intended by
Congress-by manipulating conflicting case precedent (Shunk
and Nichols) and adding one more confusing case to an already
murky area.8 0 The Tenth Circuit rejected the Tax Court's result
largely through the simplistic application of a questionable
limitation (Teschner) on an uncontrolling tax principle (the
assignment-of-income doctrine under section 61)."8 And the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Tenth Circuit by
reading an ambiguous sentence in the regulations in a manner
which was unresponsive to economic reality and the underlying
purpose of section 482.82

This Comment has suggested that section 482's purpose of
achieving tax parity between controlled and uncontrolled
taxpayers is best served by taxing the controlled taxpayer on
78

The Internal Revenue Code limits charitable deductions to payments. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 170. If income were allocated to a fundraiser, the implication would be

that he could have received payment for his efforts from the charity. By foregoing this
he would have made the equivalent of a deductible charitable contribution.
payment,
79

Seenotes 61-63 supra & accompanying text.
The Tax Court's reasoning was set forth in its opinion in Local Financ4 on which it
based its decision in First Security. The Seventh Circuit adopted essentially the same
8

See text accompanying notes 27-36 supra.
reasoning.
81
See text accompanying notes 43-54 supra.
Seetext accompanying notes 55-68 supra.

82
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income which he generates but which the controlling interests
divert to a related entity, regardless of the taxpayer's legal right
to receive the income directly. The traditional arm's-length
standard admittedly does not compel the Commissioner's
allocation in cases such as First Security, but neither does it
preclude the allocation. Rather, the arm's-length standard simply
provides inadequate guidance for adjudging the propriety of
allocations in illegality-of-receipt cases. We have suggested that
the courts should view the arm's-length standard as a
particularized version of the proposed generation-of-income
standard, which should serve as the general test for allocations of
income under section 482 and which would have provided a
basis on which the Supreme Court could have upheld the
Commissioner's allocation of commission income to the Banks in
First Security.

